Abstract: Post-conflict aid has mainly been assessed using macroeconomic analysis. This paper investigates the effectiveness of post-conflict aid at a project level and aims to identify post-conflict situations as a window of opportunity for project success. The Independent Evaluation Group dataset provides extensive information on the characteristics of World Bank projects including an independent rating of their success, supervision and evaluation quality. We estimate the probability of success of aid projects depending on the characteristics of the intervention and look for possible special patterns in post civil war situations. The results suggest that a project started during the early years following the peace-onset has a higher probability of success. Preparation and supervision appear to be crucial determinants of success, especially in post conflict countries. Focusing on sectoral intervention, we find that projects in the health and private sectors, as well as in urban development, are more successful in early postconflict environments. On the contrary, projects targeting economic policy, education and social protection will succeed more once peace has been sustained over a few years.
Introduction
Post-conflict aid has already been assessed using macro-economic analyses. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that there is a window of opportunity for higher than normal aid effectiveness in terms of growth in post-conflict situations, provided that donors intervene following a suitable sequence. During the first few years of peace, the absorptive capacity of aid is about twice what it is usually: aid volumes should therefore gradually build up during the first few years of peace and then gradually revert to normal levels after around a decade.
Post-conflict countries face another major challenge: risk reduction. Post-conflict peace is fragile and Collier et al. (forthcoming) find that the risk of renewed violence after a civil war is around 40%. Post-conflict aid can contribute to reducing the risk of renewed outbreak of conflict. Duponchel (2008) shows that aid stabilizes post-conflict environment, but in a non-linear way: the optimum ratio of aid to increase the chances that peace will last is around 4.8% of GDP, notably higher than the 2.3% average observed in her sample.
We propose to analyse post-conflict aid effectiveness using information on the success or failure of World Bank projects. These projects are assessed by an independent institution, the IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). The IEG has provided the evaluation of all World Bank projects worldwide since the sixties. Along with its assessment, this database provides information on the characteristics of each project (investment versus budget support; IDA or IBRD projects, financial conditions, NGOs involved, etc.) and on the supervision and preparation efforts of World Bank staff.
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Using the same database, Isham and Kaufmann (1999) , Dollar and Svensson (2000) , Kilby (2000) , Dollar and Levin (2005) and Chauvet et al. (2006) analyse the respective importance of donors' effort and recipients' macro-economic and institutional characteristics for the success of World Bank projects. From this literature, no consensus has emerged as to whether the success or failure of World Bank projects primarily depend on countries' political economy or on projects' characteristics, notably the supervision of projects.
This paper aims at exploring the role of post-conflict situations as a window of opportunity for the success of World Bank projects. We estimate the probability of success of aid projects and look for special patterns in post-conflict situations. We also investigate whether post-conflict situations need particular sectoral targeting, enhanced supervision effort or special sequencing of project launching.
In Section 2, we present our econometric model, the IEG data on World Bank projects and some descriptive statistics on aid projects in post-conflict situations. In Section 3, we explore whether projects in post-conflict countries are likely to be more or less successful than in other developing countries. In Section 4, we investigate the timing of projects with respect to the end of wars, and try to identify when during postconflict should projects be launched in order to maximize the chances that they succeed. In Section 5 we explore whether post-conflict situations call for a special sectoral targeting of aid projects. Finally, our main results are summarized in Section 6.
Econometric Model and Data
We estimate the probability of success of World Bank projects and explore whether projects in post-conflict situations follow a different pattern. To do so, we estimate a model of the following form: 
where j (j = 1…J) denotes projects and i (i = 1…I) denotes countries. We consider that Success j,i equals 1 whenever the outcome of World Bank projects is assessed by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) as satisfactory or highly satisfactory. The IEG rates the outcomes of the projects independently. Three factors are considered: the relevance of the intervention's objectives in regard of the country needs and institutional priorities; the extent to which the objectives have been achieved; and the efficiency of the project being the extent to which the objectives have been achieved without using more resources than necessary. Based on the scores the outcome of the project is rated from being highly unsatisfactory to being highly satisfactory.
In this paper, we use the IEG database covering projects started from 1961 to 2002. During this period, over 6,400 projects have been evaluated in all sectors and most countries. Information is provided on the outcome of the project, but also on the characteristics of the project. Pj, the characteristics of project j, do not vary overtime. They include the primary sector of intervention, whether the project is an IDA or an IBRD project, whether it is an investment project or not, whether the preparation and the supervision of the project are assessed by IEG as satisfactory or not. All projects considered in the analysis have been evaluated and therefore have been closed. We deliberately used the original closing date of the project to define its duration in order to avoid potential endogeneity linked to the revised closing date vis-à-vis the success of the project.
C j,i is a set of characteristics of country i averaged over [t; t-3] where t is the starting date of project j. Hence, for a project that started in 2000, each country variable is calculated over the period 1997-2000. This way of controlling for country characteristics means that for two projects occurring in the same country, C j,i may end up being very different according to the period on which the project was launched. We introduce the growth rate, which is expected to positively influence the probability of success of the project, and so is the per capita GDP level. The average ratio of aid received by the country is also introduced as a control as well as the ratio of fuel exportations as a fraction of GDP. We looked at the average Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score in the preceding period 1 ; a project implemented in a more stable environment is expected to have more chance of being successful. The population variables allow controlling for the size of the country. Finally, War j,i , is a set of variables relating to the history of the conflict in country i. Of course the history of conflict varies according to the time period and again, two projects occurring in the same country but in different decades may end up with quite different conflict history.
As the idea of the paper is to analyze the success of projects more specifically in post conflict environment, it is all the more necessary to understand and best catch the history of the war vis-à-vis the project. This appears to be a tricky business. Figure 1 illustrates the method of reasoning. From this tree we derived the set of War j,i variables.
The first step, at the country history level, was to distinguish between the countries that have always been at peace since 1945, like Ghana or Tunisia, and countries that have suffered from a civil war or multiple episodes of war such as Sierra Leone or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The dummy variable AT_PEACE is equal to one for the countries that never had a civil war.
In order to define the civil war episodes, we used the PRIO version 4-2007 database and chose the high intensity criterion, namely at least a 1,000 war related death per year 2 . This, of course, inevitably leads us to different results than if we used a lower level of casualties. Indeed, wars are shorter using this definition. It also implies that the country reported as being in a post conflict period or at peace, for example in the few years preceding the collapse into war, would have been considered at war using a lower intensity criteria, thus impacting on the results. However, the high intensity criterion allows defining clear episodes when a lower threshold could have led to unclear dating and would potentially be biased towards the level of information available on casualties.
The second step consists in focusing on the starting date of the project: was the country at war or in post conflict? This leads us to define two different variables: INIT_WAR is equal to one for countries that were at war when the project started. Symmetrically, INIT_PC is a dummy which is equal to one when the country was in post-conflict when the project started. We define post-conflict as the 15 years which follows the onset of peace.
The third step then is to focus on the project period. If the country was at war at the beginning of the project, it is necessary to indicate whether the war lasted for the duration of the project or whether peace was settled during the project. We create a dummy variable, WAR_PROJECT which is equal to one if the country was at war during the entire project. On the contrary, if war ended during the project, a dummy RETURN_PEACE is equal to one.
Similarly, if the country was in a post conflict phase at the beginning of the project and that the peace lasted during the whole project, a dummy PC_PROJECT is equal to one. If war resumed while the project had already started, a dummy RETURN_WAR is equal to one.
The final step will investigate the timing of the project vis-à-vis the conflict or the peace. We generate a variable, PC_DURATION, which counts the number of years of post-conflict peace when the project started. Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics on the database of project we used and the history of war of the countries. Interestingly, the sector repartition is relatively similar whether the country is at peace, at war or in post conflict at the beginning of the projects, with around a quarter of the projects implemented in the rural sector and around 10 to 15% in the energy and mining sector. 
Timing

Econometric Results
We estimate Equation (1) using a probit. Our sample is reduced by the introduction of some of the control variables for country characteristics. From more than 6,000 projects, we end up with slightly more than 2,000 projects, covering the period 1977-2002.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, we explore whether the probability of success is different in post-conflict situations. This leads us to include, one step at a time, all the variables capturing the history of conflict during the project. We then ask when during the post-conflict period projects should be started so that they have the greatest chance of success. Third, we explore whether post-conflict situations call for improved supervision and preparation. Finally, the sectoral sequence of post-conflict intervention is analyzed.
Are post-conflict projects more successful?
The first column of Table 2 includes all our control variables. It suggests that the longer the project, the smaller the chance of success. On the contrary, better preparation and supervision increase the probability of success of World Bank projects. IDA projects are also relatively more successful than IBRD projects. Interestingly, whether the project is an investment project or not does not seem to impact the probability of its success.
Regarding country-level characteristics, only income growth and the CPIA score are significantly different from zero. Both increase the chances that World Bank projects will succeed, suggesting that a better economic and institutional environment, combined with economic growth are favorable to aid projects.
We first include the first and second levels of information on conflict history, as described in Figure 1 . The dummy AT_PEACE is significantly positive, suggesting that countries that never had a civil war are better off when it comes to the success of aid projects. At this stage of our analysis, whether the project starts in a country at war (INIT_WAR) or in post-conflict (INIT_PC) does not seem to matter for the success of World Bank projects.
In column (2) of Table 2, we include the third level of information regarding the history of conflict. That is we include the dummies WAR_PROJECT, RETURN_PEACE, PC_PROJECT and RETURN_WAR along with our other war variables. None of these dummy variables is even nearly significant. Out of our War j,i variables, only AT_PEACE is significant. This result has two possible interpretations. The first one is that what matters for the success of projects is peace as opposed to war and post-conflict peace. Another potential interpretation of this result is that, even with this level of disaggregation of the conflict history at the beginning of the project, we may not be properly catching the impact of post-conflict on the success or failure of projects. 
When during post-conflict is it best to start a project?
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 push further the analysis of post-conflict projects. They examine when, during the post-conflict period, aid projects have the highest chance of success. To do so, we include PC_DURATION, which measures the number of years, at the starting date of the project, since peace onset. We also include its square to capture possible non-linear relationships between the probability of success and the time elapsed since peace onset.
These two variables are significant and suggest a U-shaped relationship between the probability of success of aid projects and the time since war ended. Interestingly, being in a post-conflict environment at the time when the project starts (INIT_PC) is now significant at 10%, with a positive coefficient.
Columns (3) and (4) suggest that starting a project in a post-conflict environment increases the chance that the project will succeed. But as time goes on in the postconflict period, the probability of success decreases. Around four years after the end of a war, the initial positive impact linked to the post-conflict environment disappears. The impact on the success of projects of being in a post-conflict situation becomes negative and reaches a minimum at around 9 years after peace onset. It then starts increasing again and becomes positive at the end of the post-conflict period, around 14 years after the peace onset. Figure 2 shows how the probability of success evolves according to how much time has elapsed since the end of the war. 
Should supervision and preparation be different in post-conflict?
Post-conflict situations may call for better preparation and supervision of aid projects.
The IEG database provides information on whether the quality of supervision and preparation of projects by World Bank staff was satisfactory or not. Both variables are rated on a scale from 1 (highly unsatisfactory) to 4 (highly satisfactory). As already suggested by our baseline regression (reported in column (1) of Table 3 ), better supervision and preparation increase the prospects of success of World Bank projects.
The second and third columns of Table 3 explore the impact of preparation and supervision in post-conflict situations. The coefficients of 'INIT_PC x Preparation' and 'INIT_PC x Supervision' both suggest that for projects starting in a post-conflict environment, the better preparation and supervision, the higher the probability of success of the project. Controlling for the quality of preparation and supervision provokes a switch in the sign of INIT_PC, though, which becomes negative and significant at 1%, in both columns (2) and (3).
This result suggests that instead of increasing the chance of success, starting a project in a post-conflict situation may well affect negatively its success if preparation and supervision are not good enough. Figures 3 and 4 show that the impact on the probability of success of the fact of being in the first year post-conflict is positive only for highly satisfactory preparation (preparation = 4) and satisfactory and highly satisfactory supervision (supervision = 3 and 4).
How does this impact evolve over time? Looking at the interaction effects of postconflict peace duration with preparation and supervision gives a more precise picture of how supervision and preparation affect the success of project in post-conflict situations. The quadratic relationships are no longer significant in column (2), with preparation included, while they are still highly significant in column (3) with supervision included. Even though the last two rows of Table 3 suggest that PC_DURATION, its square and the interaction terms of PC_DURATION with preparation are jointly significant, the coefficients -notably of square terms -are such that the U-shaped relationship found in Table 2 is now flatter. At the extreme, if preparation is highly unsatisfactory (preparation = 1), the impact on the probability of success of being in post-conflict starts being highly negative and increases linearly as time goes on. After 11 years in a post-conflict environment, the impact on the chance of success becomes positive, and better or worse preparation does not seem to matter anymore.
For supervision, the picture is rather different. Figure 4 depicts the impact on the probability of success of the time spent in post-conflict, for different values of supervision. If supervision is satisfactory or highly satisfactory (supervision = 3 and 4), then being in a post-conflict situation has a positive impact on the probability of success during two years (if supervision = 3) or four years (if supervision = 4). Then the impact of being post-conflict becomes negative, up to the end of the post-conflict period, which we have set at 15 years. If supervision is unsatisfactory (supervision = 2) or highly unsatisfactory (supervision = 1), then the impact of being a post-conflict country on the probability of success is negative throughout the post-conflict period. It is slightly less negative around the middle of the post-conflict episode. Introducing sector dummies interacted with the post-conflict characteristics allows investigating whether the probability of the project being successful is peculiar in post-conflict environment depending on the sector of intervention. In other words, is there some kind of sectoral sequence of intervention in post-conflict situations? In Table 4 , we investigate whether projects are more likely to succeed in some sectors rather than in others in post-conflict situations. The Table in Appendix 2 reports the results when sector none of the sector variables are significant.
The results suggest that projects targeting economic policy have a significant lower probability to fail in post conflict ceteris paribus. In fact, the coefficient reports that economic policy projects started in a post conflict phase have a 60% lower chance of being successful, as rated by IEG. However, looking at the timing it seems that the effects of the duration since onset of peace follows a U inversed path. This consequently implies that for economic policy projects, the probability of success rises in the first nine years after the peace-onset, and then starts decreasing. The graphic below underlines that if the economic policy project starts during the first three years after the peace onset, the probability of success is lower every thing else held constant. However, the impact on the chance of success becomes then positive with a maximum reached when the project starts around the 9 th year of peace. Looking at column (2), the projects in the education sector appear to have a significant higher probability of success (by over 10 %). However this specificity of education projects disappears when implemented in post conflict environment and thus independently of the starting date. As shown by the results, education projects will then actually have a lower probability of success (around 5%).
On the contrary, health projects tend to be more successful in post-conflict environments than other projects (by almost 13%) ceteris paribus. The effect follows a U shaped path depending on the duration since the peace onset. Until the 5 th year, the impact is lower and then it increases. The results suggest that health project in post-conflict countries should therefore be implemented in the second half of the decade following the peace settlement in order to increase their chance of success. We observe the same U shaped variation for environmental projects (last column).
A similar pattern U shaped is discernable in the case of projects focusing on private sector development. However, the p-value of the joint significance test for INIT_PC and INIT_PC interacted with the sector dummies underlines that those projects do not have a significant different probability of success in post conflict countries. However, time matters, the impact first decreases and then increases when implemented after the 7 th year of peace.
Column (5) aims to investigate whether the probability of success is different for projects in the urban development sector. The coefficient of the dummies interaction is positive and significant, suggesting that everything else being equal, projects in the urban development sector implemented in post conflict settings have a 20% higher probability of success. However none of the p-values of the joint significance tests are significant.
Finally, the results reported in column (6) show that projects targeting social protection have a significant lower productivity in post conflict environment (80 % less), but as before the dummies and the interaction term are not jointly significant. However it is worth noticing that timing matters. Indeed, the effect of the duration since peace onset increases until around the 9 th year, when it decreases again.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the determinants of the success of World Bank's projects in post-conflict situations. Our econometric analysis suggests that being a post-conflict country at the time where the project starts increases the probability that the project will succeed. But this effect does not last long: after three or four years, the impact of being in a post-conflict situation on the chance of success may even become negative.
Preparation and supervision of projects seem to be crucial for their success, even more in post-conflict situations. If preparation and supervision are not satisfactory enough, the fact of being a post-conflict country may have an adverse impact on the success of projects, even in the first years of peace. However, it is worth keeping in mind that supervision and preparation may be endogenous to the success of project and our results must therefore be treated with caution. We intend to tackle this issue in the next version of the paper.
Post-conflict situations also seem to call for a peculiar sequence of sectoral intervention. Projects in the health sector, and targeting the private sector and urban development seem to be more successful in early post-conflict environments, while projects on economic policy, education and social protection seem to be more likely to be successful after a few years of peace. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
